Many constitutions specify procedures that allow critical decisions to be made with a different rule than routine decisions. We propose a theory of constitutional rules that explains why. The theory is based on the assumption that the type of a decision can be observed, but not veri…ed. We characterize two classes of second-best constitutions, both with clear analogues in real world constitutions: i) incentive scheme (IS) constitutions that elicit information about the type of a decision through a costly decision rule switching procedure and ii) veto (VT) constitutions that grant limited veto powers to interested parties. We explore how the relative performance of the IS and the VT constitution depends on the underlying environment.
Introduction
A constitution can be understood as a social contract that sets out the rules that govern the way a society makes collective decisions. The details of these contracts vary from society to society. Despite this, the world's constitutions share, in one way or the other, a common feature:
procedures that allow critical decisions -decisions that, if approved, in ‡ict large losses on some individuals -to be made using a di¤erent and stricter decision rule than the rule used for routine decisions. The US Constitution, for example, allows the President to veto decisions made by Congress, and a veto can only be overruled by a 2/3 majority of the members of Congress. Similar systems are used in many other countries (Shugart and Carey, 1992) . In other cases, the constitution includes provisions for popular referendums that allow citizens, who collect a su¢cient number of signatures, to request that some policies be subjected to a referendum. The Italian and Swiss constitution provide two examples of this, but popular referendums are also widely used by US states. A third example is the …libuster-cloture procedure in the US Senate. This procedure allows determined senators to obstruct the voting on a bill through prolonged speeches (…libuster), and a time limit on the speeches can only be imposed with the consent of 60 senators out of 100 (cloture).
These examples illustrate a general principle: many constitutional rules are designed to ensure that critical decisions do not pass unless they satisfy a stricter decision rule -e.g., a supermajority rule or they must survive a referendum -than the default decision rule used for routine decisions.
The challenge for constitutional designers in implementing this principle, of course, is to identify which decisions are critical. Given that individuals who stand to lose from a particular decision or reform always have an incentive to claim that the decision is critical if doing so makes it more di¢cult to implement it, the constitutional rules must be designed to ensure that a request to transfer a decision from the domain of the default decision rule to the domain of the stricter alternative rule is made only if the decision is truly critical. This paper proposes a theory of constitutional rules that shows how this can be achieved through rules observed in actual constitutions. In doing so, the paper sheds new light on the role of constitutional rules as diverse as the popular referendum, the …libuster, and veto powers: all these rules serve the common purpose of ensuring that critical decisions are separated from routine decisions and are harder to pass.
To make our argument, we consider a society with a large number of individuals. These individuals must choose between a reform A and the status quo B. Some (the "winners") prefer the reform, while others (the "losers") prefer the status quo. The magnitude of the loss incurred by losers depends on the reform's precise nature. We make a distinction between critical and routine reforms. Routine reforms are associated with modest losses and can be interpreted as decisions about relatively minor changes to the status quo. Critical reforms, on the other hand, are associated with much larger losses, e.g., because they violate certain fundamental rights. At the time when the constitutional rules are laid down, individuals do not yet know whether they will gain or lose from the reform, nor do they know the type of reform. Thus, the constitution is designed from the original position, behind a veil of ignorance. After the veil of ignorance is lifted, but before voting takes place, it becomes known if the reform is critical or not.
The …rst-best can be achieved by designing reform-dependent majority rules which make critical reforms more di¢cult to pass than routine reforms. This, however, requires that the type of reform (the costs and bene…ts associated with it) can be veri…ed. This is sometimes possible, but more often it is impossible to do. For this reason, the constitutional rules cannot, in general, be contingent on the utility that individuals derive from reforms. We identify this as the fundamental problem that constitutional designers must address. One simple solution is to apply a single majority rule to all types of reforms. The problem with this is that if the rule makes it di¢cult to pass critical reforms, it makes it di¢cult to pass all reforms, something which is clearly undesirable in itself. We interpret this type of constitution as a lower bound on what constitutional designers can aspire to achieve in the realistic case where the type of reform cannot be veri…ed objectively, but where it's type can be observed by individuals before voting takes place. The fact that individuals observe the type of reform before voting takes place provides constitutional designers with the opportunity to design rules that elicit this information. We consider two types of constitutional rules that can achieve this: an incentive scheme (IS) constitution and a veto (VT) constitution. Both of these embody two majority rules: a default majority rule and a stricter alternative rule that can only be applied under certain circumstances speci…ed in the constitution.
The IS constitution includes a rule switching procedure that determines when the alternative rule can be used. Switching to the alternative rule, however, involves a switching cost¸. This cost is borne by those who want the switch to happen and is chosen by the constitutional designer to ensure that the rule switching procedure is used if and only if the reform is critical. This constitution, then, e¤ectively elicits information about the type of reform and allows society to employ reform-dependent majority rules. An important consideration in designing IS constitutions is whether the switching cost¸should be "paid" in wealth or in time. Wealth has the advantage of being relatively easy to transfer and this makes it possible to reduce the welfare impact of the switching cost, but is unevenly distributed among citizens. As a consequence, poor citizens are barred from using the procedure and it is, for this reason, not always possible to separate critical reforms from routine reforms. Time, on the other hand, is available to all and by, for example, specifying¸as the number of signatures required to trigger a referendum, the constitutional designer can ensure that the rule switching procedure is open to all and that decisions irrespective of the wealth distribution get separated correctly. The down-side is that time is di¢cult to transfer and¸therefore becomes a deadweight cost that is incurred every time a rule switch happens. We show that, when critical reforms are su¢ciently bad for losers, the constitutional designer prefers to specify the switching cost in terms of time, and incur the associated deadweight cost. This provides a new rationale for why actual constitutions often include procedures that allow citizens to collect signatures to trigger popular referendums. Our analysis o¤ers a new perspective on referendums that complements existing agency-based theories of direct democracy (Matsusaka, 1992 (Matsusaka, , 2005 Gerber, 1996) by pointing to a distinction between popular and mandatory referendums that has been overlooked by previous theories. We also argue that similar procedures are used in a legislative setting and so our approach shows how much otherwise very di¤erent constitutional rules, such as the …libuster-cloture procedure and the popular referendum, have in common. The VT constitution takes advantage of the fact that societies have to consider many policy reforms, not just one. The VT constitution grants veto powers to an individual (or to a collective of individuals). The veto holder has the right to veto reforms that would otherwise have passed with the default decision making rule. Reforms that are vetoed are then either blocked altogether or can only pass if the veto is overridden. We assume that veto holders incur costs every time they veto and that these costs are increasing in the number of vetoes previously called. In contrast to the IS constitution, these costs are not deliberately designed to ensure incentive compatibility, but should be thought of as reputational costs. On top of this, only losers have an incentive to call vetoes and so, it is important, e.g., by appointing more than one veto holder, to ensure that at least one losers holds veto rights. The fact that the cost of calling a veto increases with the number of vetoes previously called implies that losers have an incentive to economize on the use of their veto powers and only veto legislation that they really dislike. As a consequence, routine reforms are mostly (but not always) allowed to pass without veto, while vetoes are mostly (but not always) used for critical reforms. The VT constitution provides a new rationale for veto powers in actual constitutions: veto powers are granted to presidents or legislative bodies because they help separate critical reforms from routine reforms. Of course, we are not claiming that this is the only role that vetoes play in constitutional design and we view the rationale emerging from our theory as being complementary to other reasons for granting veto powers to constitutional players (see, e.g., Tsebelis, 2002; Cameron and McCarty, 2004) . The objective of both the IS and the VT constitution is to establish if a reform is critical or not before it is put to a vote, but they do so in very di¤erent ways and with di¤erent costs and bene…ts. The IS constitution achieves full revelation, but does so at the cost¸. The VT constitution, on the other hand, cannot guarantee full revelation: if it is too "cheap" or too "expensive" to call an extra veto, the VT constitution sometimes forces society to make decisions with the wrong majority rule. The relative performance of the IS and the VT constitution and, ultimately, the choice of constitutional rules, depends on the underlying fundamentals. Our analysis suggests that IS constitutions are likely to perform well compared to VT constitutions in situations where i) critical reforms carry high costs, but rarely appear on the agenda, ii) policy makers are relatively short-sighted and/or face an uncertain future and, iii) it is di¢cult to guarantee that veto powers fall into the hands of losers and not winners.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review of the related theoretical literature. In Section 3, we introduce our model. In Section 4, we introduce two benchmark constitutions and discuss the question of vote-buying and the role of the Coase Theorem. In Section 5, we analyze the IS constitution. In Section 6, we analyze the VT constitution.
In Section 7, we compare the welfare properties of the IS and the VT constitution and study the conditions under which each constitution performs better than the other. In Section 8, we conclude. The appendix at the end contains some of the proofs.
Related Literature
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the fundamental questions related to constitutional design. 1 One strand of this literature argues that constitutions are incomplete social contracts. According to this view, constitutions cannot be designed to make policy decisions directly because constitutional designers cannot foresee all future states of nature and/or because these states of nature cannot be veri…ed ex post. This makes it impossible or extremely costly to write a full state-contingent plan into the constitution. As a consequence, the argument goes, the role of constitutions is to de…ne the rules that govern policy making. 2 Within this framework, several papers have, under the (implicit) assumption that only voting outcomes are ex post contractible, analyzed constitutions that specify a single (majority) rule and have characterized how the optimal rule depends on the parameters of the model. Aghion and Bolton (2003) show that the optimal choice of a majority rule from behind the veil of ignorance is determined by a trade-o¤ between two considerations. On the one hand, a strict majority rule is desirable because there is a need to limit excessive ex post redistribution. On the other hand, a lax majority rule is desirable in order to make it harder for those who lose out (ex post vested interests) to block socially desirable reforms. 3 Aghion et al. (2004) focus on a rule that contains the power of political leaders. They show that the optimal degree of insulation measured as the share of votes needed to block legislation is determined by a trade-o¤ between allowing the political leader enough leeway to rule and restricting the scope for misuse of power.
We share with these papers the incomplete contracts approach and the assumption that constitutional choices are made from behind the veil of ignorance, yet our goals are di¤erent. The existing literature focuses primarily on the problem of excessive ex post redistribution. In doing so, it makes the simplifying assumption that the type of reform is known and that all 1 The classical work in the area is Buchanan and Tullock (1965) . See also Mueller (1996) . 2 Dixit (1996) presents an overview of this approach. See La¤ont (2000) for an exposition of the alternative view that considers constitutions as complete contracts and argues that the need for constitutions arises from information asymmetries. For a theoretical defence of the incomplete contract approach, see Hart and Moore (1999) . 3 This approach has been further developed by Gersbach (2002) . Maggi and Morelli (2006) consider the issue of self-enforcement in this context. reforms are identical. We, in contrast, argue that uncertainty about the type of reform is an important consideration in constitutional design and that societies have to take into account the fact that some reforms -those which are critical -in ‡ict much larger costs on those who lose than routine reforms. The constitutional problem, therefore, becomes one of designing rules that e¤ectively separate critical reforms from the rest. While the previous literature could represent constitutions as a single rule, we must, as a consequence of this, deal with the choice between several rules and study how this choice varies with changes in the fundamentals. 4 To highlight this departure from the existing literature, we do not allow for ex post redistribution. This, however, is a simplifying assumption without qualitative implications for our results; our analysis can, at the cost of considerable extra complexity, be extended to allow for ex post redistribution.
Another strand of the literature argues that constitutions are not written behind the veil of ignorance but by individuals who know their position in society. 5 Messner and Polborn (2004), for example, study a situation where the decision rule used to govern future decisions is itself decided by the simple majority rule. They show how supermajority rules emerge in an overlapping generations framework where the young can decide on the size of the majority needed to approve decisions when they become old. Most policies introduce immediate costs while bene…ts arrive later. Older voters, therefore, su¤er more from reform than young voters and this provides an incentive for young voters to choose a supermajority rule. Barbera and Jackson (2004) study the broader question of when voting rules are self-sustaining and, therefore, likely to endure. They show that constitutions with two decision rules are often more stable then constitutions with a single rule. Finally, Ticchi and Vindigni (2003) analyze how economic factors in ‡uence the choice of a majoritarian versus a consensual constitution.
We have chosen to model constitutional design behind a veil of ignorance for a variety of reasons. Firstly, this assumption corresponds nicely to the notion that constitutional designers are "founding fathers". If the individuals who design constitutions care su¢ciently about the future, they will be careful not to design a constitution that makes it either too easy or too di¢cult to pass reforms. This is because they might, for example, gain from today's reforms, but lose from tomorrow's reforms. Secondly, any truly positive theory of constitutional design relies heavily on the details of the assumed constitutional bargaining process. In contrast, we obtain results that rely solely on the veil of ignorance assumption. Thirdly, our approach provides a benchmark against which actual outcomes might be measured and, as we shall discuss in detail below, the constitutional rules that arise from our model have clear counterparts in real world constitutions.
Our analysis is also related to a recent literature on incentive constraints and decision linking.
In our analysis of veto constitutions, we draw on the framework developed by Casella (2005) and Jackson and Sonnenschein (2006) . They demonstrate how a principal, by linking decisions, can elicit agents' private information. We demonstrate how a similar logic can be applied to constitutional design and argue that such mechanisms play an important role in practice.
The Setup
We consider a society with a large but …nite number of individuals i = 1; :::; N. These individuals di¤er in their attitudes towards a policy reform (x = A) that, if adopted, changes the status quo (x = B). Their attitude to the reform is determined by Nature. Individuals who prefer A to B are called "winners" and individuals who prefer B to A are called "losers". The key feature of the model is that there exist two di¤erent types of policy reforms, indexed by ! 2 f!; !g. Reforms of type ! are routine reforms with low stakes, while reforms of type ! are critical reforms with extraordinarily high stakes for the losers. These could, for example, be reforms that violate some fundamental right. We normalize the payo¤ of all individuals under the status quo to 0. The utility gain (loss) of a winner (loser) is w (¡l) from a routine reform and W (¡L) from a critical reform, where
That is, critical reforms are much more costly to losers, and have a lower bene…t-to-cost ratio than routine ones. The type of reform is determined by Nature and we assume that
There exist two endowments of resources, which we call wealth and time. The endowments di¤er in two respects. First, wealth is more "liquid" than time in the sense that it is less costly to transfer wealth from one individual to another than it is to transfer time. Second, time is more evenly distributed among individuals than wealth. 6 To make this trade o¤ between the two types of endowments -wealth is relatively easy to transfer, but unevenly distributed, while time is available to all, but hard to transfer -as sharp as possible, we make two extreme assumptions. We assume that each individual is endowed with a given quantity r > 0 of time which, however, cannot be transferred to other individuals. In contrast, wealth can be transferred without deadweight cost, but is unevenly distributed among individuals. In particular, there exist two possible allocations of wealth, indexed by Ã 2 fÃ; Ãg. In allocation Ã, all winners are endowed with a quantity R > 0 of wealth and losers have no wealth. In allocation Ã, it is the losers who have an endowment R of wealth while winners have no wealth. The probability that winners have wealth R (so that winners are rich and losers are poor) is
The parameter°controls the distribution of wealth: if°is high, it is likely that those who stand to bene…t from reform are rich; if it is low, it is likely that they are poor.
The total utility of an individual is the sum of the utility she gets from the policy outcome and the utility she gets from her endowments of wealth and time, net of what she might spend to a¤ect policy outcomes. Throughout, utility functions are linear and additively separable in these components. We de…ne a constitution as a mapping from i) the set of strategies of individuals and ii) those features of the environment that are veri…able, into the policy space fA; Bg. The timing of events in the baseline model can be summarized as follows:
1. From behind the veil of ignorance, one of the members of society (called the constitutional designer) designs a constitution.
2. Nature selects a value p from a cumulative distribution function F with support on the unit interval and strictly positive density f . Given p, Nature determines, independently for each individual, who is a winner and who is a loser. This is observed by everyone but is not veri…able.
3. Nature selects the type of reform ! and the allocation of wealth Ã. We assume that the state of nature f!; Ãg is observable. While Ã is never veri…able, we consider both the case in which ! is veri…able and the case in which it is not.
4. Anyone can propose policy A as an alternative to the status quo B.
5. If a proposal is made, the constitution may call upon individuals to take some action (see below).
6. Individuals vote for A versus B. The result of the vote is observed and is veri…able.
7. The policy outcome is determined according to the constitutional rules laid down in stage
1.
The interpretation of the time line is the following. At the constitutional stage (stage 1),
no individual yet knows if he or she is a winner or a loser. Neither do individuals know how many winners and losers there are in the population (the realization of p), the type of reform (the realization of !), nor the allocation of wealth (the realization of Ã). As a consequence, the constitutional rules are laid down from behind the veil of ignorance, and it does not matter who designs the constitution.
Once the constitution is designed, winners and losers are determined by Nature (stage 2). Firstly, Nature draws a value p from the cumulative distribution function F. Given p, Nature, determines for each individual i if he or she is a winner or a loser. This is done by a sequence of independent draws from a Bernoulli distribution with p being the probability that an individual is a winner. Let n be the number of winners resulting from the N Bernoulli trials. As the population size N increases, the proportion n N of individuals who favor reform over the status quo converges to p. To simplify the analysis, we shall abuse the law of large numbers by assuming that p = n N . 7 We assume that p and whether each individual is a winner or a loser is observable, but not veri…able. These assumptions about p can be relaxed without signi…cant consequences for the results. Whether or not it can be veri…ed if an individual is a winner or a loser is, however, of importance in Section 6.
In stage 3, Nature determines the type of reform ! and the allocation of wealth Ã. This timing implies that the welfare consequences of a reform are known before voting takes place, but after the constitution is designed. We consider both the case in which the type of reform can be veri…ed by a court and that in which it cannot. In the former case, the constitutional designer can tailor the decision rules to each type of reform. This is not possible, however, when ! is not veri…able and the main contribution of the paper is to analyze ways in which the constitutional designer might overcome this problem. The fact that the distribution of wealth is not veri…able information is also important because it rules out constitutional procedures that depend on the distribution of wealth in society.
In stage 4, we allow anyone in the population to propose a reform. All winners gain from such reform, and cannot be worse o¤ by making the proposal. 8 When the reform type is unveri…able information, the constitution may, in stage 5, allow or require individuals to take certain actions that may reveal information to a constitutional court about the type of reform !. This information may, then, be used to determine which constitutional rule is used to make the policy decision. In Sections 5 and 6 this will be our main focus.
In stage 6, voting takes place. We assume that if an individual prefers A to B, she will vote in favor of A so that voting is sincere. The number of votes in favor of policy A can be veri…ed.
Finally, given the rules laid down by the constitution, and the choices made by individuals in stages 4 and 5, whether the reform is adopted or not is determined in stage 7. We assume that a court guarantees that the constitutional rules are enforced.
Benchmark Constitutions

The First Best
We de…ne the …rst best as a situation in which reforms are only adopted when they are ex-post e¢cient, i.e., routine reforms are adopted if and only if
and critical reforms are adopted if and only if
We denote the expected utility associated with this outcome by EU ¤ F B .
In the hypothetical situation in which the wealth distribution is veri…able information, the …rst best can be implemented by a set of wealth-dependent constitutional rules. The reason is that the rich, are willing (and able) through vote-buying to compensate the poor if and only if the outcome favored by the rich is e¢cient. 9 It would therefore seem that the Coase Theorem resolves all constitutional issues. This, however, ignores transaction costs. If, as in Aghion and Bolton (2003) , vote-buying is associated with transaction costs, the …rst best cannot be obtained with wealth-dependent constitutional rules, the Coase Theorem does not apply and a need for reform-dependent rules arises. More importantly, in the presence of such transaction costs, the constitutional designer wants, in fact, to prohibit vote-buying (by, say, introducing secret ballots or making vote-buying illegal). This is because, as we shall see below, the …rst best can also be implemented by reform-dependent constitutional rules, but only if vote-buying is prohibited. 10 For this reasons, and to simplify the analysis, we rule out vote-buying in the rest of the paper.
The endowment of wealth, therefore, plays a role only in Section 5 where it can be used to trigger certain constitutional rules. 11 We stress that this simpli…cation has no qualitatively impact on any of our results.
Reform-dependent Constitutional Rules
In situations where the type of reform (!) is veri…able information, the constitutional rules can be contingent on reform type. We can de…ne a reform-dependent constitution as follows: 
The RD constitution employs two majority rules. Routine reforms can pass with a m-majority, while critical reforms can pass with a M-majority. These rules depend on reform type (the 9 To be precise, if the winners are rich ( Ã = Ã), the optimal constitutional rule is the unanimity rule: reforms can only pass with the support of all individuals. This replicates the …rst best because the winners, through vote-buying, are willing to compensate all the losers if and only if the reform is e¢cient. Similarly, if losers are rich (Ã = Ã), the optimal constitutional rule is a "reverse" unanimity rule: the status quo can only be preserved if nobody supports reform. This implements the …rst best because losers are willing to compensate all the winners for voting against reform if and only if the status quo is e¢cient.
1 0 [Note to referees: this is included in our supplementary material] 1 1 Given that we rule out vote-buying, there is no loss of generality in assuming that wealth can, for other purposes, be transferred without deadweight cost. What matters is that the transaction costs associated with wealth transfers are lower than the corresponding costs for transfers of time. A formal argument is available on request. 1 2 The symbol "^" should be read as "and" while the symbol "_" should be read as "or". Since we assume that individuals vote sincerely and since we have ruled out vote-buying, the individuals who vote in favor of the reform are the winners and those who vote against are the losers. realization of !). We emphasize that the notion of majority rules should not be taken literally and that m and M should be interpreted as two di¤erent procedures for implementing policy reforms, one of which is more demanding that the other. 13 The RD constitution that maximizes the expected utility of a representative individual from behind the veil of ignorance is characterized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1
The optimal RD constitution uses majority rules
and yields expected utility
Proof. From behind the veil of ignorance, the expected utility of the constitutional designer iś
To maximize the term
it is optimal to set m so that reforms pass if and only if
which yields m RD . Similarly for M RD . This achieves the …rst best. The fact that m RD < M RD follows from the assumption that
The most important implication of proposition 1 is that two separate and non-unanimous decision rules are optimal: a lenient majority rule m RD for routine reforms and a strict majority rule M RD for critical reforms. Moreover, the optimal RD constitution implements the …rst best because reforms of the two types are only allowed to pass if the welfare gain to winners is at least as great as the welfare loss to losers. 14 This simple result provides a theoretical foundation for some real-world constitutional rules. For example, most of the world's constitutions require special rules to amend the constitution itself (Lutz, 1994) . Also, international treaties often require special procedures for rati…cation: in the US, for example, a two thirds majority in the Senate is required. These constitutional rules can be thought of as special procedures applying to reforms which are veri…ably critical, as constitutional amendments and international treaties almost always are.
Single Majority Rules
In most cases, however, it is not possible to verify whether a given reform is critical or not.
The objective of the constitutional designer then becomes one of designing constitutional rules that as closely as possible approximate the …rst best rules. One possible response is to design a constitution with rules that only depend on the number of individuals voting in favor of reform. In this case, a single majority rule must be applied to all types of reforms, whether routine or critical, and the constitutional designer is restricted to consider the following class of constitutions:
The next proposition characterizes the MR constitution that maximizes expected utility from behind the veil of ignorance.
Proposition 2
The optimal MR constitution uses the majority rule
Proof. The proof is similar to that of proposition 1. The properties of the optimal majority rule follow by inspection¤
In the absence of uncertainty about the type of reform (´= 0 or´= 1), the optimal majority rule, m MR , equals one or the other of the reform-dependent rules. In all other cases, the optimal MR constitution must strike a compromise between the need to avoid applying too strict a rule to routine reforms and the need to avoid applying too lenient a rule to critical reforms. Clearly, this compromise reduces expected utility below the …rst best level. The welfare loss is particularly large when critical reforms are really important (in the sense that L is large), but rare (in the sense that´is high). In this case, it is virtually optimal to require unanimity for all types of reforms despite the fact that critical reforms are highly unlikely. Put di¤erently, in order to avoid that rare, but costly critical reforms pass too easily, the optimal MR constitution makes it almost impossible to pass any reform. This is clearly not desirable in itself and constitutional designers will strive to design rules that separate critical from routine reforms. The challenge is to design rules that elicit information about the type of reform from individuals in society, and use the revealed information to improve on the optimal MR constitution and to approximate the …rst best reform-dependent rules.
We characterize and compare two alternative constitutional mechanisms -an incentive scheme constitution and a veto constitution -that in di¤erent ways answer this challenge. We believe that these alternatives employ constitutional rules that correspond closely to solutions found in actual constitutions (see Sections 5.4 and 6.3) and later identify the circumstances under which each of the alternatives is preferred to the other and to the optimal MR constitution (see Section 7).
Incentive Scheme Constitutions
In this section, we consider a class of constitutions -incentive scheme (IS) constitutions -that through a rule switching procedure, allow for di¤erent majority rules to be applied to di¤erent types of reforms. Formally, an IS constitution prescribes three rules: a default majority rule m (intended for routine reforms), a rule switching procedure and an alternative majority rule M (intended for critical reforms). The rule switching procedure requires individuals to undertake a costly action which involves paying the switching cost¸. The action triggers a switch from the default to the alternative majority rule. When the switching cost is chosen appropriately, information about the type of reform can be elicited truthfully as individuals have an incentive to use the rule switching procedure only when reforms are critical. As a consequence, the constitutional designer can selects a lenient majority rule for routine reforms and a strict majority rule for critical reforms.
The switching cost¸can either be speci…ed in terms of wealth or in terms of time. In the former case, individuals who wish to trigger a switch have to transfer a certain amount of their wealth to a constitutional court which in turn redistributes the transferred wealth among all individuals. Since, by assumption, such transfers of wealth carry no transaction costs, the rule switching procedure is not associated with any deadweight cost and we say that the rule switching procedure is "costless". In the latter case, individuals who wish to trigger a switch have to invest a certain amount of their time endowment in the task. This implies that the switching cost is a deadweight cost and we say that the rule switching procedure is "costly". Throughout this section we assume that F is a uniform distribution with support on the unit interval.
Constitutions with a Costless Rule Switching Procedure
We begin with the case where the switching cost is speci…ed in units of wealth. The time line is as in Section 3, except that we need to specify how the rule switching procedure in stage 5 works:
5a. All individuals i = 1; :::; N decide simultaneously how much of their wealth ¾ i¸0 to transfer to a "constitutional court." If P N i=1 ¾ i¸¸t hen the court demands that majority rule M is used to determine whether the reform passes or not. If P N i=1 ¾ i <¸then the court demands that majority rule m is used. The aggregate transfer, P N i=1 ¾ i , is reimbursed on an equal per capita basis to all members of society, so the share of individual i is
The rule switching procedure allows individuals to use their endowment of wealth to trigger a switch in the majority rule from m to M. This happens if the aggregate transfer made to the constitutional court is no smaller than the switching cost¸speci…ed in the constitution.
The "constitutional court" plays a dual role in this process. Firstly, the court checks whether the aggregate transfer is su¢ciently large to trigger a rule switch. Secondly, it ensures that the aggregate transfer is reimbursed to individuals on an equal per capita basis. The notion of a constitutional court should not be taken literally. The important feature of the rule switching procedure is that the procedure, when used, does not in itself entail a social loss.
To simplify the analysis, we make two additional assumptions. Firstly, we assume that the individuals of the two groups are rule-utilitarians in the sense of Harsanyi (1980) , Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) . That is, each individual takes an action that, if taken by all members of his or her group, would maximize that group's aggregate utility given the behavior of the individuals in the opposing group. This allows us to abstract from free rider problems and assume that if one winner (loser) makes a transfer to the court, then all winners (losers) make a similar transfer. Secondly, we assume that the aggregate wealth in the economy is su¢ciently large to cover the switching cost. Formally, we consider the following class of constitutions.
De…nition 3 An incentive scheme constitution with a costless rule switching procedure (IS 1 ) is a triple (m; M;¸) such that
where m 2 [0; 1] and M 2 [0; 1] are majority rules and¸¸0 is the switching cost, speci…ed in units of wealth, that triggers a switch in the majority rule from m to M. 15 The purpose of the IS 1 constitution is to separate critical from routine reforms and then apply di¤erent majority rules to the two types of reforms. To characterize the optimal IS 1 constitution, we need to answer two questions. First, can incentive compatibility be achieved? In other words, can the constitutional designer de…ne a switching cost such that individuals pay it if and only if the reform is critical, and if so, is it optimal to write an incentive compatible rule switching procedure into the constitution? Second, what are the optimal majority rules?
We provide heuristic answers to these questions below, but formal proofs are available upon request. 16 To answer the …rst question, we …x the majority rules M > m. This implies that only 1 5 Technically speaking, the I S1 constitution consists of the whole constitutional mechanism, not just the majority rules and the switching cost¸. However, for simplicity, we henceforth describe each constitutional mechanism by the elements of the mechanism that the constitutional designer optimizes. 1 6 [Note to referees: this is included with our supplementary material.]
the losers have an incentive to use the rule switching procedure because the winners never want to make the majority rule more strict. Since¸is speci…ed in units of wealth, the losers cannot use the rule switching procedure when they are poor. Thus, the best the constitutional designer can hope for is correct separation of reforms when the losers are rich.
Recall that the number of winners and losers, and thus p, is observed. As a consequence, losers have no incentive to pay¸when p < m or p > M because a switch in rules, in this case, does not change the policy outcome. However, when m · p < M, a rule switch preserves the status quo (B) whereas the default rule would let the reform (A) pass and losers bene…t from a switch. How much they bene…t, of course, depends on the type of reform. If the reform is routine, the gain is l and a representative loser would prefer not to pay his or her share of the switching cost whenever the cost ³Ņ ¡n´i s greater than the bene…t
where we have taken into account that the switching cost is reimbursed on a per capita basis.
On the other hand, if the reform is critical, a representative loser is willing to pay the switching cost if and only if¸<
Incentive compatibility can be achieved if and only if¸satis…es both of these inequalities. The magnitude of the switching cost is decided behind the veil of ignorance before p becomes known.
Therefore, in order to guarantee incentive compatibility for all p 2 [m; M), the switching cost must be such that
Given this, the expected utility of the constitutional designer from behind the veil of ignorance is
We note that
whatever p and¸are. This shows that the switching cost is a pure transfer from the losers to the rest of the population: its size has no direct welfare implications from behind the veil of ignorance. As a consequence, the constitutional designer will always set¸to achieve incentive compatibility, if possible, and then select the two majority rules to maximize expected utility
, then, yields the optimal constitution:
The optimal incentive scheme constitution with a costless rule switching proce-
where
The optimal IS 1 constitution has two notable features. First, the fact that the switching cost¸does not directly a¤ect the expected utility of the constitutional designer does not mean that it is irrelevant, nor does it imply that the …rst best can be achieved. In order to guarantee incentive compatibility,¸I S 1 must be larger than zero. As a consequence, when losers are poor they do not have the wealth needed to cover the switching cost. In these cases, the constitution fails to deliver a switch in rules when critical reforms are on the agenda, leaving the default rule m IS1 to be used for all types of reforms and this means that the IS 1 constitution cannot achieve that …rst best. We note that this failure is entirely due to the uncertainty about the realization of Ã (the wealth distribution) as captured by°. 17 Only in the limit, when°is equal to zero (losers are always rich), can the …rst best be achieved.
Second, the two majority rules have a simple interpretation. The alternative rule M is set at the …rst best level. The reason is that the rule switching procedure is only used when it should be; that is, when the reform on the agenda is critical. In contrast, the default majority rule m is, on the one hand, stricter than the …rst best rule m RD because incentive compatibility cannot be achieved when losers are poor, and, on the other hand, more lenient than m MR because incentive compatibility can be achieved when losers are rich. In fact, the default majority rule approaches the …rst best rule m RD when°converges to zero (losers are almost always rich) and approaches m MR when°converges to one (losers are almost always poor).
Constitutions with a Costly Rule Switching Procedure
The IS 1 constitution fails to achieve the …rst best, despite the fact that wealth can be costlessly transferred, because wealth is not equally distributed among individuals. The constitutional designer may want to circumvent this problem by specifying that the switching cost¸be "paid" by spending some of the time endowment. In this way, all individuals, can, in principle, use the rule switching procedure. The downside is that the time endowment is not transferable, making the switching cost a deadweight cost as opposed to a costless transfer. To analyze this trade o¤ formally, we need to specify how the rule switching procedure works with a switching cost expressed in units of time. We maintain the assumption that individuals are rule-utilitarians and that the aggregate endowment of time in the economy is su¢ciently large to cover the switching cost. We modify stage 5 of the time line as follows:
5b. All individuals i = 1; :::N simultaneously decide how much of their time endowment ¾ i¸0 to spend on switching the majority rule from m to M. The aggregate amount spend is observed by a constitutional court. If P N i=1 ¾ i <¸, then the court rules that the default majority rule m is used to determine policy. If P N i=1 ¾ i¸¸, then the court rules that the alternative majority rule M is used.
The only substantial di¤erence between this rule switching procedure and that analyzed in the previous section is that the switching cost is "paid" with the time endowment and, therefore, cannot be reimbursed to individuals. As a consequence, the resources used to trigger a rule switch ( P N i=1 ¾ i ) represent a deadweight loss to society and the rule switching procedure is in itself costly. With this in mind, we can de…ne an incentive scheme constitution with a costly rule switching procedure (IS 2 ) as in de…nition 3 with the exception that the switching cost¸must now be "paid" with time.
In an IS 2 constitution where the alternative majority rule M is stricter than the default majority rule m, it is only the losers who have an incentive to use the rule switching procedure and they would only do so when it matters for policy outcomes, i.e., when m · p < M. Incentive compatibility requires that a representative loser pays his or her share of the aggregate switching cost¸if and only if the reform is critical, i.e.,
To ensure incentive compatibility for all p 2 [m; M), the three constitutional rules must, therefore,
Under that assumption that m, M and¸are set to achieve incentive compatibility 18 , the constitutional designer's expected utility can be written as
The last line represents the expected deadweight cost associated with the rule switching procedure. From behind the veil of ignorance, the cost of a rule switch is (1 ¡ p)Ņ (1¡p) =Ņ which is paid each time a critical reform comes up (which happens with probability 1 ¡´) and the general support for reform in society (p) is such that it would pass unless there is a rule switch (p 2 [m; M)).
For a given¸, the two majority rules that maximize the constitutional designer's expected utility are
Substituting these majority rules into equation (5.2), we see that incentive compatibility is guaranteed whenever¸2 [´ẃ w+l Nl; N L).
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Since the constitutional designer's expected utility is decreasing in¸, the optimal switching cost iş
which implies that the optimal majority rules are
Since the switching cost represents a social loss, the constitutional designer might, in principle, …nd it too expensive to insure full incentive compatibility and decide to allow it to fail for some p. It turns out, however, that this is never optimal. To see this, suppose, …rst, that¸and m are such that 1 ¡ļ N > m. In this case, for any p 2 ¡ m; 1 ¡ļ N ¢ the losers will use the rule switching procedure irrespective of the type of reform and incur the switching cost¸. This e¤ectively makes 1 ¡ļ N the majority rule at which routine reforms pass. By increasing m to 1 ¡ļ N , the constitutional designer would obtain identical policy outcomes, but avoid incurring the switching cosţ . This is clearly better and thus, it cannot be optimal to have 1 ¡ļ N > m. Second, suppose that 1 ¡Ļ N < M. In this case, for any p 2 ¡ 1 ¡Ļ N ; M ¢ , the switching cost is too high and losers will never pay it. This implies that all types of reform pass for p > 1 ¡Ļ N and the constitutional designer could decrease M to 1 ¡Ļ N without a loss. 1 9 Since L > l, this interval is well de…ned.
This has an important implication. When critical reforms are common (´is low), losers must pay the switching cost¸I S2 regularly to guarantee that such reforms are decided by the strict majority M IS 2 . Once´falls below the threshold´¤, it is no longer optimal to have a strict alternative majority rule and a lenient default rule: it is better to avoid the switching cost altogether by specifying a single majority rule in the constitution. From Section 4.3, we know that the optimal single majority rule is m MR . 20 We summarize the preceding analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 4
1. For´>´¤, the optimal incentive scheme constitution with a costly rule switching procedure (IS 2 ) is (m IS2 ; M IS2 ;¸I S2 ).
2. For´·´¤, the optimal incentive scheme constitution with a costly rule switching procedure
, where m MR is de…ned in equation (4.3).
The proposition highlights an important distinction between situations in which critical reforms are rare (´>´¤) and situations in which such reforms are common (´·´¤). In the former case, the constitutional designer selects rules that elicit the information about the type of reform truthfully and distinct majority rules can be applied to di¤erent types of reform. This is what makes the IS 2 constitution attractive. The downside, of course, is that the deadweight cost¸I S 2 is incurred whenever a critical reform appears on the agenda. This is taken into account in the design of the two majority rules which are only second best as m IS2¸mRD and M IS2 · M RD .
By reducing the di¤erence between the two rules m and M, the constitutional designer can achieve incentive compatibility at lower social cost but this, of course, also reduces the advantage of having two separate majority rules. In short, the constitutional designer trades o¤ the utility cost of reducing the di¤erence between the two majority rules against the bene…t of reducing the switching cost. If´·´¤, critical reforms are common and each time one of them appears on the agenda, the switching cost is incurred. In this case, it is too expensive to elicit information about the type of reform. So, the constitutional designer avoids the switching cost altogether by applying the same majority rule to all decisions: nobody wants to trigger a rule switch if there is no di¤erence between the two rules. In e¤ect, the constitutional designer chooses the optimal MR constitution instead.
It is an essential feature of the IS 2 constitution that the switching cost is an aggregate cost that is proportional to the size of the society (N). This ensures that it is never in the interest of the losers as a group to use their wealth endowment -when they have one -to compensate each other for the time cost of triggering a rule switch when routine reforms are on the agenda. As a consequence, incentive compatibility can be guaranteed irrespective of whether losers as a group are rich or poor. To see the signi…cance of this, we note that all losers know the type of reform; this means that it is, in principle, su¢cient to get one of them to reveal this information. Therefore, one could imagine an alternative constitutional mechanism that calls upon one loser chosen at random to invest the time required to switch the rule. If¸is the switching cost, incentive compatibility would be ensured for¸2 [l; L). Substituting, say,¸= l in equations (5.4) and (5.5), we see that the optimal rules approximate the …rst best rules when the society (N) is large. Moreover, from behind the veil of ignorance, the expected switching cost is small. In short, it would seem that something very close to the …rst best could be achieved. The problem with this argument, however, is that while¸= l guarantees incentive compatibility for a single individual, it does not do so for losers as a group. When the aggregate wealth endowment of the losers is positive, they can compensate the one individual who is supposed to pay for the switching cost, irrespective of the type of reform. As a consequence, this constitution would e¤ectively work like the IS 1 constitution but (since is N is …nite) with an additional (small) deadweight cost. Thus, this constitution would be dominated by the IS 1 constitution and so the only incentive scheme constitutions that do not unambiguously dominate each other are IS 1 and IS 2 constitutions.
Comparison of IS 1 and IS 2 Constitutions
Neither of the two incentive scheme constitutions analyzed above can achieve the …rst best, but both can sometimes improve upon the MR constitution. Thus, a key question from an constitutional designer's point of view is whether they can be welfare ranked from behind the veil of ignorance.
Proposition 4 shows that the frequency with which critical reforms appear on the agenda (´) determines whether or not the optimal IS constitution with a costly rule switching procedure (IS 2 ) is preferred by the constitutional designer to the MR constitution. In contrast, the optimal IS constitution with a costless rule switching procedure (IS 1 ) is always better than the MR constitution. Recall, however, that when L is large and critical reforms in ‡ict large losses on those who lose from their adoption, the threshold´¤ is small so that IS 2 constitutions almost always improve upon the MR constitution. What is more, the next proposition shows that the IS constitution with a costly rule switching procedure dominates the IS constitution with a costless rule switching procedure when critical reforms are su¢ciently important, i.e., when L is su¢ciently large.
Proposition 5 For any´2 (0; 1), there exists a L ¤ (´) (decreasing in´) such that for all L > L ¤ (´) the optimal IS 2 constitution yields higher expected utility than the optimal IS 1 constitution.
Proof. Substitute the optimal rules into the expected utility functions given in equations (5.1) and (5.3). The limit of the di¤erence as L becomes large is positive:
¤ In choosing between the two types of IS constitutions, the constitutional designer faces a trade o¤ between the bene…ts of being able to separate critical from routine reforms and the cost of achieving this separation. The IS constitution with a costly rule switching procedure (IS 2 ) correctly separates critical reforms from routine reforms, but generates a deadweight loss in the process (¸I S2 ). The IS constitution with a costless rule switching procedure (IS 1 ) avoids the deadweight loss, but incentive compatibility sometimes fails because the losers occasionally lack the resources needed to use the rule switching procedure. As L increases, it becomes more and more important to identify critical reforms and treat them di¤erently. At the same time, since the deadweight cost¸I S 2 is independent of L, the cost of achieving incentive compatibility does not rise just because critical reforms become more costly. This shifts the trade o¤ in favor of achieving correct separation of reforms.
Another way to understand the proposition is to note how the decision rules (m and M) are adjusted to accommodate an increase in L. The majority rules employed by the IS 1 constitution both converge to 1 as L becomes large. The reason is that incentive compatibility sometimes fails and critical decisions therefore may end up being made with the lenient majority rule (m). When critical reforms in ‡ict disproportionately large losses (L ! 1), it is optimal to block all reforms to avoid any critical reforms slipping through. In contrast, the IS 2 constitution guarantees incentive compatibility and m IS2 can, therefore, be lenient -because only routine decisions will be passed with this rule -while critical decisions are blocked by setting M IS 2 close to 1. We conclude that it is the fact that the value of allowing routine decisions to pass (with a m IS 2 -majority) is larger than the deadweight cost that makes the IS 2 constitution the optimal constitutional choice when L is large.
Discussion
Our theoretical analysis of IS constitutions stresses the importance of switching costs. These are essential to ensure incentive compatibility and that decisions are allocated to the correct decision rule. In reality, the switching cost is predominately, if not always, associated with some timeconsuming task with no intrinsic social value, as opposite to transfers. From a practical point of view, therefore, proposition 5 is important because it provides a rationale for this practice based on the fact that the resources (time and e¤ort) needed to cover such costs are more evenly distributed than wealth. This ensures that those with intense preferences regarding a particular reform or decision -irrespective of whether they are rich or poor -can use the rule switching procedure simply by spending time and e¤ort. Moreover, by undertaking apparently useless tasks, individuals prove in a way which is easy to verify that they care enough about policy to warrant a change in rules. 21 Real world constitutions contain many examples of incentive schemes, which like the IS 2 constitution, use a costly rule switching procedure to single out critical decisions. A leading example is the popular (or facultative) referendum. Here, the default decision rule is that a reform must clear the legislative process (m) to be adopted, but if a su¢cient number of signatures is collected (¸), then it must also pass a popular vote. Approval (or repeal) by referendum, typically, requires a 50 or more per cent majority among all eligible voters and is often subject to a quorum requirement. This is a stricter test than that required for obtaining a majority in the legislature alone (Lutz, 1994) . Thus, a switch from the normal decision making procedure -a majority in the legislature -to the alternative decision making procedure (M) -a majority in the legislature plus approval by popular referendum -makes it harder to pass reforms. 22 Popular referendums are allowed by 24 U.S. state constitutions (Matsusaka, 2003) and are widely used in Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Constitution speci…es that all laws issued by the federal government can be made subject to the facultative referendum if 50,000 signatures are Liechtenstein, for example, has a system similar to that of Switzerland and the Italian constitution allows 500,000 voters to request a popular (abrogative) referendum to decide on a total or partial repeal of a law passed by parliament. Many of the new democracies that emerged in Europe after the cold war and the breakdown of the USSR adopted the popular referendum (Kaufmann and Waters, 2004 ). In the Baltic states of Latvia and Lithuania, for example, popular referendums can be held at the request of 10 per cent of the population and 300,000 citizens, respectively. Popular 2 1 There exist other reasons for not wanting monetary payments to be the trigger for rule changes in real world constitutions. One of them is that an agenda setter may have an incentive to propose policies that "force" others to pay the switching cost, just to obtain some of these payments. 2 2 Another example of an IS constitution is the popular initiative. In this case, the default decision rule is that reforms can be adopted through the legislative process (M). However, they can also be adopted through a popular vote but only if a su¢cient number of signatures (¸) is collected. This new decision making procedure (m) -a majority in the legislature or a popular ballot -makes it easier to pass the reform because the referendum gives the reform an "extra" chance (see Matsusaka (2003) for more discussion of the popular initiative). Within our framework, however, such an incentive scheme can only be incentive compatible if the gains associated with routine decisions are larger than the gains associated with critical decisions (w > W). This is because, with the popular initiative, it is the winners who need an incentive to put a reform on the ballot. While the popular initiative is an example of a (reverse) IS constitution and can be formally rationalized within our framework, we believe that it is designed to deal with situations where the gains from some, but not all, reforms are particularly large and not with critical decisions as de…ned in this paper. Nevertheless, a formal characterization is available upon request.
referendums are also allowed in Slovenia, Hungary and Poland. While popular referendums are not permitted at the federal level in Germany, they are widespread among the federal states where 10 citizen-initiated referendums have taken place since uni…cation in 1990.
We stress that popular referendums should not be confused with mandatory or advisory referendums, where the constitution demands a popular vote on speci…c issues, nor should they be confused with the plebiscite which is a referendum called by the central authorities. The critical di¤erence is the signature requirement associated with the popular referendum. This is what allows it to serve the role of separating critical reforms from the rest. Nonetheless, our analysis can also provide a rationale for why real world constitutions sometimes include mandatory and other types of referendums. 23 Mandatory referendums typically apply to speci…c decisions such as constitutional amendments or rati…cation of international agreements. These decisions are often, if not always, critical decisions and can be easily veri…ed by a court and therefore singled out for special treatment. As discussed in Section 4.2, this makes it possible to design reform-dependent constitutional rules. More generally, when decisions with similar cost-bene…t pro…les can be grouped together and it is possible to verify if a particular decision belongs to one group or the other, special rules can be designed to deal with groups of decisions which are deemed to be critical ex ante. Incentive schemes, such as the signature requirement associated with popular referendums, on the other hand, are of greatest value when it is hard or impossible to verify the costs and bene…ts associated with particular reforms.
Obstruction in legislative assemblies provides another, very di¤erent, example of an IS constitution. Obstructing legislation e¤ectively makes it more di¢cult to pass bills (M) than with the default rule (m), but it requires that those who wish to stop a bill are prepared to bear a personal cost (¸). The …libuster-cloture procedure in the U.S. Senate, for example, allows minority senators to prevent a …nal vote on a bill through prolonged speeches (…libuster), dilatory motions and disappearing quorums. 24 A time limit on these speeches can only be imposed with the consent of 60 senators out of 100 (cloture). 25 As argued by Bawn and Koger (2003, p. 2) "...because e¤ort is scarce, …libustering involves signi…cant opportunity costs, costs that legislators will not be willing to bear unless their preference is su¢ciently intense." Thus, senators are only likely to use this procedure for critical decisions, in case of which the e¤ective test that such decisions have to pass is a 60 per cent majority. Consistent with this, Evans (1999) reports that since the cloture rule was introduced in 1922, the …libuster has had a signi…cant impact on policy outcomes and that the …libustered bills, in one way or the other, were critical to the senators involved. 26 All this strongly supports the view that the …libuster-cloture procedure is not just a 2 3 See, e.g., the constitutions of France, Denmark, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Romania. 2 4 Although this procedure is not written down in the U.S. constitution, it is a constitutional rule in the sense that it is a rule that governs how decisions in the Senate are made. See the discussion in Burdette (1940) and Binder and Smith (1997) . 2 5 Krehbiel (1998) shows how the …libuster-cloture procedure restricts the set of feasible policy reforms. 2 6 Binder and Smith (1997, p. 517). These include calling for a vote by roll call (e.g., paragraph by paragraph), haranguing the Assembly for hours, or demanding that proposals be sent back to committees. All of these tactics share the feature that obstruction can only be successful if considerable time and e¤ort is devoted to the task. In short, the rules of the General Assembly leaves ample room for committed agents to make it di¢cult to pass critical decisions.
It is interesting to compare our approach to previous theoretical work on direct democracy and the …libuster. The literature on direct democracy has emphasized the fact that referendums involve citizens in policy-making and in doing so, they help to address the principal agent problem between citizens and legislators. In particular, Gerber (1996) argues that referendums help to solve this problem by allowing voters greater and more direct in ‡uence on policy. Matsusaka (1992; stresses that asking voters to decide directly on divisive issues that do not require much expert knowledge has informational advantages. Besley and Coate (2003) point out that referendums allow policies to be unbundled and that this can enhance accountability and improve outcomes for citizens. Theoretical work on legislative obstruction has focused mainly on how the …libuster-cloture procedure in the U.S. Senate restricts the set of feasible policy reforms (the win set) by e¤ectively serving as a supermajority rule (e.g., Krehbiel, 1998) , although Bawn and Koger (2003) do stress, as we do, the importance of the cost involved in the process of obstruction.
We view our approach as being complementary to these contributions. We stress the incentive e¤ects associated with popular referendums and the …libuster but acknowledge that direct democracy and legislative obstruction, in practice, serve many other purposes. Importantly, however, our approach highlights two points that to be the best of our knowledge have been overlooked by the literature. Firstly, there is a fundamental di¤erence between popular and mandatory referendums. The fact that citizens have to invest time and e¤ort in collecting signatures to trigger a popular referendum is what allows popular referendums to separate critical reforms from the rest. The mandatory referendum can only do this if it is possible to verify ex-ante which decisions are, in fact, critical. Secondly, while our approach draws out the di¤erence between mandatory and popular referendums, at the same time, it demonstrates commonalities between otherwise very di¤erent constitutional rules and provides a uni…ed framework within which these rules can be understood. In particular, we argue that popular referendums and legislative obstruction also a wide range of topics from consumer protection, taxation and campaign …nance to the federal death penalty and presidential nominations. As they point out, this almost surely underestimates the impact of the …libuster because it does not take into account anticipated reactions, collateral damage etc.
serve the common purpose of ensuring that critical reforms are identi…ed and subjected to a stricter test than routine reforms.
As argued above, real world constitutions include many rules that legislators and citizens can use to express preference intensity by undertaking actions that are costly to them. We have argued why these costs are "paid" in time and e¤ort rather than in money. Indeed, we are aware of no examples of constitutional rules and procedures that explicitly express "switching costs" in monetary terms. Of course, this does not mean that money never plays a role. For example, in many U.S. states it is possible to hire professionals to help collect the signatures needed for a popular referendum or an initiative. As a consequence, "those who use the process [the popular referendum or the initiative] either can a¤ord the cost of the initiative industry or relay upon highly motivated volunteers to meet the signature threshold" (Magleby, 1988, p. 607) . Thus, the signature requirement leaves the door open for all to use the popular referendum, but it is clear that in the real world the rich still enjoy an advantage. It is also clear that the switching cost has to be carefully designed to ensure incentive compatibility. 27 Indeed, our theory shows that under certain conditions (´·´¤) these constitutional mechanisms cannot improve upon the single decision rule. Accordingly, constitutional designers might want to explore other rules that can be used to deal with critical decisions. In the next section, we consider one such alternative: veto powers.
Veto Constitutions
In this section, we analyze an alternative constitutional mechanism, called a veto (VT) constitution, that, like the incentive scheme constitution, can elicit information from citizens about the type of reform. The idea is to grant veto powers to an individual (or a collective of individuals), called the veto holder. The veto holder has the right to veto reforms that would otherwise be passed with the normal decision making rule. Reforms that are vetoed are then either blocked altogether or can only pass if the veto is overridden. Calling a veto is, however, not a free lunch.
A veto carries few direct costs, but there are signi…cant indirect costs that arise when veto powers are used excessively because important relationships with other constitutional players may break down. In Section 6.3, we discuss the sources of these costs in more detail; for the theoretical analysis, it is su¢cient to note that the cost of calling a veto is an increasing function of the number of vetoes already called. This provides the veto holder with an incentive to economize on his or her use of veto powers and only veto legislation that he or she really dislikes. As a consequence, routine reforms are allowed to pass without a veto, reserving vetoes for critical reforms. When vetoed, critical reforms are blocked or can only be approved if they can pass the stricter test required to override the veto. In this way, the veto constitution can separate critical from routine reforms.
Formally, we consider a society that has to make T¸2 decisions, one in each of T periods.
The parameter T should not be interpreted literally as the number of decisions that society has to make. Instead, we interpret T as an indicator of the time frame within which policy making takes place after the veil of ignorance has been lifted. A society with a high value of T is a society in which the members, once the veil of ignorance has been lifted, are relatively patient because decisions are made within the context of a relatively long and/or certain time frame. In contrast, a society with a low value of T is one in which the members are more short-sighted because decisions have to be made within the context of a short and/or uncertain time frame.
The veto constitution prescribes three rules: a decision rule m V T , an override rule M V T , and a veto procedure. The veto procedure allows an individual appointed by the constitution -the veto holder -to veto the reform on the agenda at time ¿, and if so, the reform can only pass if it is supported by a su¢ciently large majority to override the veto. This includes, of course, the special case M V T = 1 in which the veto is absolute and cannot be overridden. The cost of calling a veto is denoted by C (v (¿)), where v (¿) is the number of vetoes called in the previous ¿ ¡ 1 periods, with the property that C (¢) is (weakly) increasing in v. We focus on threshold cost functions of the following type:
where C > 0 is arbitrary large so that it is never optimal for the veto holder to call more than s vetoes. This simpli…es the constitutional design problem considerably because the design of C (v) is reduced to the choice of the threshold s. It is clear, however, that qualitatively similar results obtain for any increasing cost function. Ideally, the constitutional designer would appoint a loser to be the veto holder. This is because winners would not, in general, have an incentive to use veto powers in the appropriate way. If the identity (loser or winner) of individuals is veri…able information, the constitutional designer can prescribe that veto powers are given to a loser. In many cases, however, this is an unreasonable assumption, and we need to consider how the constitutional designer deals with the problem that veto powers might end up in the hands of winners. We allow for both possibilities, and to set the stage, we begin with the case where losers can be identi…ed.
Veto Constitutions with a Loser as the Veto Holder
We maintain the basic set-up from Section 3 but amend the time line by, …rstly, modifying stage 3 to capture that decisions are made repeatedly and, secondly, by describing the details of the veto procedure in stage 5:
3a. The constitution selects one of the losers to be the veto holder.
3b. For each of the ¿ 2 f1; :::; T g policy decisions, stages 3b to 7 take place sequentially until ¿ = T . For each decision, Nature makes a draw of the random variable ! to determine the type of reform at time ¿. All draws are independent and observable, but not veri…able.
5. For each reform decision ¿, the veto holder decides either to veto the reform (Â ¿ = V ) or not to veto it (Â ¿ = ?).
The timing of events implies that the winners and losers are the same each period, but that the type of reform di¤ers from period to period. 28 We can de…ne a veto constitution as follows.
De…nition 4 A veto (VT) constitution with a loser as the veto holder is a triplet
such that
and
where v (¿) is the total number of vetoes called in periods 1; ::::¿ ¡ 1.
With this de…nition in place, we can characterize the optimal veto constitution. We note that the speci…cation of the veto cost function and the assumption that the veto holder is always a loser imply that exactly s V T vetoes will be called.
Proposition 6
Let EU(m; M; s) be the per-decision expected utility associated with the veto constitution (m; M; s) and let
H(s;´; T) = (1 ¡´) T + G(s;´; T ) ¡ s:
1. For any 0 · s · T , there exist two strictly decreasing functions
and for all other majority rules m and M EU (m (s) ; M (s) ; s) > EU (m; M; s) :
Proof. See Appendix. 29 To develop intuition for these results, it is useful to begin by assuming that T is large enough to allow an accurate approximation of the binomial distribution with mean (1 ¡´) T and variancé (1 ¡´) T with the corresponding normal distribution. This and the fact that 1 · s ¤ V T · T ¡ 1 imply that we can approximate the optimal threshold of the veto cost function by the solution to the following …rst order condition: 30
where © (²) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and
3) Equation (6.1) reveals an important trade-o¤. At the constitutional design stage, the constitutional designer does not know how many reforms are going to be critical and how many are going to be routine. Therefore, the selected threshold of the veto cost function (s) may induce either too many or too few vetoes. The left hand side represents the expected cost of inducing too many vetoes (setting a threshold that is too high). This cost arises because with too many vetoes, routine reforms are vetoed. Thus, for these routine reforms to be implemented, they must be supported by enough individuals to pass the override rule (M) when it should have been enough to pass the default decision rule (m). The per-period cost of this is # 1 (m (s ¤ V T ) ; M(s ¤ V T )) and, 2 9 The proof of proposition 6 does not require that F is a uniform distribution (as section 5) and, in Appendix, we prove the proposition for a generic F. from the constitutional designer's perspective, the problem arises with probability © (²). The right hand side represents the expected cost of inducing too few vetoes (setting a threshold that is too low). This cost arises because with too few vetoes, critical reforms are not vetoed and thus adopted if they pass the default decision rule but not necessarily the override rule. The per-period cost of this is given by # 2 (m (s ¤ V T ) ; M(s ¤ V T )) and the problem arises with probability 1 ¡ © (²). It follows from equation (6.1) that the optimal threshold s ¤ V T balances these two concerns. Interestingly, when more than one decision has to be made, part 2 of the proposition shows that it is never optimal to eliminate one of the two costs entirely by setting the threshold equal to either 0 or T. This implies that an optimally designed veto constitution is always at least as good as the optimal MR constitution and strictly better for T > 1. To see why, we notice that the MR constitution is a special case of the veto constitution with s = 0 or s = T . If s = 0, the decision rule (m) is used for all decisions because no vetoes will ever be called, while if s = T , all reforms will be vetoed by the veto holder and the override rule (M) e¤ectively becomes the sole decision rule. In both cases, the appropriate choice for the (single) majority rule is m MR . The constitutional designer can, however, do better by setting the cost threshold such that some, but not all, decisions are vetoed. This is accomplished by adjusting the majority rules (and thus the costs # 1 and # 2 ) accordingly. For example, if the threshold s is small compared to T, the majority rule m (s) is chosen to be close to m MR while M (s) is chosen to be close to M RD . Intuitively, this is because it is likely that too few vetoes are called and thus, many reforms regardless of their type !, will be decided with m (s). If so, it is optimal to choose m(s) close to m MR . At the same time, it is highly unlikely that vetoes will be used inappropriately and this allows the constitutional designer to set M(s) close to the …rst best rule M RD . Conversely, if s is relatively close to T, then m (s) is chosen to be close to the …rst best rule m RD while M (s) is chosen to be close to m MR .
Part 3 of the proposition shows that optimally chosen veto constitutions are asymptotically …rst best. 31 To see the intuition, we note that the central limit theorem implies that the proportion of realizations of ! = ! (critical reforms) is asymptotically distributed according to a normal distribution with mean (1 ¡´) T and variance´(1 ¡´) T. This means that as T increases, the probability of having too many or too few vetoes decreases: in the limit, this probability converges to zero. Moreover, the per-period expected utility associated with any optimally chosen veto constitution increases in T. 32 An implication, then, is that optimally chosen veto constitutions, regardless of the other parameters of the model, yield higher expected utility than optimal 3 1 Jackson and Sonnenshein (2006) show a similar result. However, within the context of our model, proposition 6 is more general. The di¤erence between the veto constitution and the mechanism considered by Jackson and Sonneshein (2006) is that the veto constitution allows all the rules (m; M; s) to be determined optimally, while Jackson and Sonnenschein's mechanism -if applied to the context of our model -sets s = (1 ¡´) T and employs the …rst best majority rules mRD and MRD. In the limit, both mechanisms exhibit asymptotic e¢ciency, but the veto constitution dominates for any …nite T : 3 2 Asymptotic e¢ciency is not su¢cient to guarantee this result. A proof of the statement is available upon request.
IS constitutions, as long as T is su¢ciently large and veto powers can be granted for sure to a loser. We return to this in Section 7.
Veto Constitutions with Randomly Selected Veto Holders
The veto constitution considered above is based on the premise that the constitutional designer can allocate veto powers directly to a loser. In practice, this would be di¢cult or impossible because it cannot be veri…ed whether a given individual is a winner or a loser. In this case, veto powers may end up in the hands of a winner who would not have any incentive to veto critical reforms, thus reducing the value of the veto constitution.
To increase the chance that veto powers end up in the hands of a loser, the constitutional designer may consider randomly appointing more than one veto holder. Formally, let the probability that a loser is randomly chosen to hold veto powers be ² 2 (0; 1). 33 Then, if veto powers are given to q individuals, the probability that at least one of them is a loser is 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ²) q¸² and is increasing in the number of veto holders q. One potential pitfall with this scheme, however, is that winners with veto powers might have an incentive to use those powers in an obstructive way.
This happens when winners like critical reforms more than routine reforms (W > w) and winners can increase the cost of casting vetoes for losers by casting vetoes. In this case, the winner may have an incentive to exploit the spillover in the veto cost function and veto routine reforms in order to make it more costly for losers to veto critical reforms. Fortunately, the constitutional designer can avoid this problem by designing the veto cost function in such a way as to avoid such spillovers, i.e., ensure that the cost of calling a veto for each and every veto holder depends only on the number of vetoes he or she has personally called in the past, not on those called by other veto holders.
In order to characterize veto constitutions with more than one veto holder, we need to modify stage 3a and 5 from the previous section as follows:
3a'. The constitution randomly selects z = 1; :::; q veto holders. The probability that a given veto holder is a loser is ².
5'. For each reform decision ¿, the veto holders are asked sequentially if they want to veto the decision or not. If one veto holder casts a veto the reform is vetoed (Â ¿ z = V for some z) ; if no one cast a veto, the reform is not vetoed (Â ¿ z = ? for all z).
We de…ne a veto constitution with q randomly selected veto holders (V T q ) as follows: 3 3 If the constitutional designer has no additional information regarding who will be losers and winners then ² = E F (1 ¡ p). In some cases, a better guess about the identify of the losers might be made and then ² > E F (1 ¡ p). We allow for both possibilities.
De…nition 5 A veto constitution with q randomly selected veto holders (V T q ) is a quadruple ¡ m V Tq ; M V Tq ; s V Tq ; q V Tq ¢ such that
and for z = 1; ::; q
where v z (¿) is the total number of vetoes called by veto holder z during period 1 to ¿ ¡ 1.
The veto cost function exhibits two important features. Firstly, the cost of calling a veto for veto holder z depends only on the number of vetoes that he or she has called in the past, not on the vetoes called by other veto holders. This implies that winners who hold veto power will never use it. Secondly, the veto cost functions are symmetric in the sense that the threshold
is the same for all veto holders. Under the assumption that C is su¢ciently large, we can interpret s V Tq as an upper bound on the number of vetoes that it would ever be rational for the collective of veto holders to call.
In addition to the private cost of calling vetoes, captured by C z (:), it is reasonable to suppose that there are social costs associated with appointing more veto holders. These include coordination costs (e.g., multiple veto used in the same period or no veto called because one veto holder expected another to veto) and selection and set-up costs. We capture this by the cost function · (q), which is non-vanishingly strictly increasing in q and normalized such that · (1) = 0. 34 Compared to the veto constitution analyzed in Section 6. We begin the analysis by constructing the expected utility of the constitutional designer as a function of the number of veto holders q for a …xed number of decisions T. Denote the expected utility of a constitution under which s vetoes are actually called by EU (s). If a single veto holder is selected at random, expected utility can then be written as
This takes into account that the veto holder will be a loser with probability ² (and call s vetoes) and a winner with probability 1 ¡ ² (and not call any vetoes). If two distinct veto holders are selected at random, each with an independent probability ² of being a loser, we can write expected utility as
Both veto holders will be losers with probability ² 2 and, as a collective, call s vetoes; both will be winners with probability (1 ¡ ²) 2 and call no vetoes; and one of the veto holders will be a winner and the other a loser with probability 2² (1 ¡ ²) in case of which the loser calls s 2 vetoes. Generally, we can write the expected utility of a veto constitution with q randomly selected veto holders as
The next proposition shows that the gross expected utility function, ¡ (s; q), has two key properties. Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition provides a strong rationale for why constitutional designers might grant veto powers to more than one constitutional agent: by increasing the number of veto holders, it becomes more likely that at least one of them will represent the losers and use his or her powers to veto critical reforms. In fact, in the absence of coordination and set-up costs, it is optimal to have as many veto holders as possible, although the bene…ts of each extra veto holder eventually becomes negligible. However, since extra veto holders do in actual fact impose additional set up and coordination costs · (¢), the constitutional designer weights the costs and bene…ts of adding more veto holders and selects the optimal number accordingly. In particular, it follows immediately from proposition 7 and the assumption that · (q) is non-vanishingly strictly increasing in q; that there exists an optimal number of veto holders, q ¤ The optimal number of veto holders, q ¤ V T q , depends on a number of factors. Firstly, the more costly it is for society to make mistakes and not veto a critical decision that should be vetoed (# 2 ) or veto a routine decision that should not have been vetoed (# 1 ), the more veto holders are optimal. Secondly, the "accuracy" with which the constitution is able to appoint losers as veto holders plays a critical role. Both when losers are frequently selected (² close to 1) and when they are rarely selected (² close to 0), it is optimal to appoint at most a few veto holders. In the former case, it is likely that at least one of the selected veto holders is a loser; in the later, it is highly unlikely that a loser will ever be selected and so the bene…ts of more veto players cannot compensate the additional costs. Thus, it is when the uncertainty surrounding the identity of prospective veto holders is high (i.e. when ² is close to 1 2 ) that the need for many veto holders is most urgent.
While it is clear that actual constitutions appoint more than one veto holder for a variety of reasons, our analysis suggests a new reason: it is optimal to appoint multiple veto holders because it is often di¢cult to grant veto powers exclusively to those with an incentive to veto critical decisions. If it is easy to establish ex ante who will use their veto powers in the intended way ex post, it is su¢cient to have one veto holder, but if it is hard or impossible to do so, it is bene…cial to have more than one veto holders.
Discussion
The VT constitution o¤ers a new perspective on constitutional veto powers. Traditionally, veto powers have been analyzed in the context of legislative bargaining (see, e.g., the survey by Cameron and McCarty (2004) ). The focus is on how granting veto powers to, for example, a president, restricts the set of feasible policy outcomes (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989) , on how veto powers might be used strategically to build up a reputation (McCarty, 1997), or on how the number of agents with veto powers a¤ect policy outcomes (Tsebelis, 2002) . We argue that veto procedures serve an additional purpose: they allow societies to deal with critical decisions. Our theory stresses the numerous implicit costs associated with calling a veto and shows that these provide veto holders with an incentive to ration the use of vetoes and mostly call one when it really matters. As a consequence, critical reforms are more likely to be vetoed than routine reforms so that the former only pass if they generate enough support to override the veto.
Veto powers play a role in almost all political systems, but the leading example is the constitution of the USA. It gives the President the right to veto legislation originating in Congress subject to override by two-thirds of both chambers (article I, section 7). The records of the debate at the Constitutional Convention suggest that the presidential veto was included primarily to enable the President to protect executive powers from the "propensity of the legislative departments to intrude upon the rights and absorb powers of the other departments" (Bond and Fleisher, 1990, p. 6) . Thus, the delegates at the Convention very much had in mind the notion that the presidential veto was reserved for special situations in which the constitutional order was challenged.
At the same time, however, the Constitution only puts formal limits on the use of the veto through the override clause. There are no explicit cost associated with calling a veto. Yet, empirical evidence shows that the presidential veto is used with care and that US presidents have been ready to use it mostly when government is divided and when legislative stakes are high (Cameron, 2000) . 35 So, why are vote powers used sparingly? The reason is simple: it is not without cost to call a veto even if there are no direct costs associated with it. Peterson (1990, p. 8) , argues that "the chief executive and Capitol Hill are a partnership to the degree that they must jointly engage in the activity of the legislative process if there are to be statutory responses to policy issues. In short, the two must act in tandem". Within this framework, it is clear that excessive use of the presidential veto is costly as it becomes harder to obtain favorable responses from Congress in the future. A similar conclusion emerges from the more traditional president-centred view on President-Congress relations (Huntington, 1965; Neustadt, 1991) . This perspective highlights the systemic constraints that limit the formal powers assigned to the President and articulates the need for Presidents to employ their formal and informal powers strategically to achieve their long-term ends. As Neustadt (1991, p. 32) puts it "their [the Congress and the President] formal powers are so intertwined that neither will accomplish very much, for very long, without the acquiescence of the other". Again, the logic is clear:
the President needs to exercise his powers, including his veto powers, with care to secure the cooperation of Congress.
Constitutional designers in ‡uence the veto cost function by …ne-tuning the legislative process. This can, as in the case of the US constitution, be done by separating the power to propose policy from the power to veto it. A further instrument that constitutional designers can use to increase or decrease the cost of calling a veto is limits on what can be vetoed. Indeed, the nature of the veto powers granted by presidential constitutions varies enormously (Shugart and Carey, 1992, chapter 7). At one end of the spectrum, the veto power of the president is limited to vetoing entire packages of legislation (a package veto). At the other, the president may be endowed with powers to veto the speci…cs of large legislative bills (a line-item or a partial veto). Partial vetoes increase veto powers and reduces the cost of calling a veto dramatically. 36 The partial veto allows the veto holder to target speci…c elements of legislation for veto while promulgating the rest. As a result, the president can remove those bits of legislation that are most costly for his side while being careful not to antagonize the legislature too much by leaving the rest un-vetoed.
Presidents who have only package veto powers cannot do that. Conversely, the package veto gives legislative bodies the ability to logroll and mix up items that the veto holder (e.g., the president) does not like with items that he or she favors. This makes it more costly to apply a package veto than a partial veto. Partial vetoes are common in Latin American presidential systems (see, e.g., the essays in Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) ). Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador have constitutions that grant the president a partial veto on all legislation. In the Philippines, as in several US states 37 , the partial veto applies only to the budget and/or to appropriation legislation. The US president, on the other hand, is granted only a package veto. 38 The presidential veto is one clear-cut example of a VT constitution, but similar procedures can be found in some parliamentarian constitutions. Lijphart (1999, p. 204 ) notes that in many bicameral systems "the general pattern is that second chambers tend to be subordinate to …rst chambers. For instance, their negative votes on proposed legislation can frequently be overridden by the …rst chambers". Examples of countries in which this is true include the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, and Australia. The German constitution, for instance, requires agreement between the "Bundesrat" and the "Bundestag" for legislation concerning federal matters (agreement laws). This gives the "Bundesrat" veto powers on a subset of bills, amounting to about 50 per cent of all legislation. Norway is an interesting intermediate case.
The Norwegian constitution requires that legislation be approved separately by a majority in the "Lagting" and the "Oldelsting". This e¤ectively gives each of the two "ting" veto power over legislation, although the veto is not absolute: if one of the two "ting" calls a "veto", the proposed legislation must be considered in the "Storting" and can only pass with a 2/3 majority. 39 While the cost of calling vetoes provides the incentive of veto holders to economize on their use, the override rule (M) determines how hard it is to reverse a veto and, thus, to pass critical decisions. The most common rule for overriding a veto is a two-thirds majority in both chambers in bicameral systems or in a single chamber for unicameral assemblies (Shugart and Carey, 1992, pp. 149-52). The US constitution is one example of this. Venezuela's constitution is another. Other countries have lower thresholds for overrides. Some have either an absolute or a simple majority. An absolute majority requires that half of all members of the relevant chamber(s) are in agreement to override. This is a harder test than a simple majority which only requires 50 per cent of those present subject to quorum. Brazil and Nicaragua are examples of countries with an absolute majority override rule. In Paraguay, the constitution requires a 2/3 majority to override a package veto, but only a simple majority to override a partial veto. However, even with a simple majority override rule, the partial veto can be a powerful tool. This is because logrolling might break down when legislators are asked to vote on single items one at the time (to override the veto). These variations in the nature of the override rule are consistent with our theory and may re ‡ect cross country di¤erences in the importance of safeguarding against critical decisions.
Finally, Tsebelis (1995 Tsebelis ( , 2002 introduces the notion of a veto player as an individual or a collective actor whose agreement is required for a policy decision to pass and argue that the number of veto players determines policy stability (how hard it is to change the status quo). 40 An implication of this theory is that constitutional designers must decide how much policy stability is desirable and, thus, how many constitutional veto players are optimal. Our analysis suggests a new rationale for adding (or subtracting) constitutional veto players to the legislative process. Since only those who stand to lose from a critical decision can be expected to veto it, constitutional designers must …nd ways of maximizing the likelihood that a loser is placed in a position to veto critical decisions. When there are clearly de…ned ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities that are likely to be on the losing side of critical legislation, this is relatively easy to do, but our results show that in the absence of this, a case can be made for increasing the number of veto players. An implication, then, is that we should not observe a disproportionately large number of veto players in countries that are divided along ethnic, geographical or linguistic lines: it su¢ces to allow each group veto powers, with little risk that these powers will be misused. Conversely, in countries where the lines of con ‡ict are more blurred or shifting over time, relatively more veto players are needed to minimize the risk that veto powers fall into the wrong hands.
Comparison of IS and VT Constitutions
IS and VT constitutions both aim at separating critical from routine reforms but approach this in di¤erent ways. It is, therefore, of interest to ask if the two types of constitutions can be welfare ranked. Our analysis emphasizes two important di¤erences between them. The …rst di¤erence is that VT constitutions cannot guarantee that routine and critical reforms are correctly separated while IS 2 constitutions can. The second di¤erence is that the expected utility of a VT constitution is increasing in the number of decisions T while the expected utility of an IS 2 constitution is independent of T. The failure of VT constitutions to separate reforms correctly is most costly to society in situations in which critical reforms are very important in the sense that L is large, but, at the same time, the problem is alleviated as T increases. From the point of view of the constitutional designer, therefore, the analysis predicts that ² IS 2 constitutions are, ceteris paribus, better than V T constitutions when L is large relative to T and vice versa.
Recalling that T is a measure of how long the time horizon facing policy makers after the veil of ignorance has been lifted is and/or how certain this time frame is, we can interpret this as saying that VT constitutions perform better in those political systems where i) the legislative calendar is busy and ii) the duration of the legislature is known with certainty. The second point is especially interesting because it draws attention to a di¤erence between political systems in which the sessions of the legislature are of …xed duration and those where they are not. In particular, our theory suggests that vetoes are less e¤ective in parliamentary systems, where legislatures can be dissolved following a censure or no-con…dence vote (Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998) or in presidential systems where the president has the power to dissolve the assembly. Indeed, anecdotal evidence supports the prediction that the power to veto legislation and the power to dissolve the legislature tend to be substitutes rather than complements within presidential systems (Shugart and Carey 1992, This means that VT constitutions not only are the preferred choice of constitutional designers when the legislative calendar is busy, but also when critical decisions are common. Critical decisions are likely to be relatively common in federal systems because of frequent con ‡icts between states and federal institutions concerning critical issues such as matters of jurisdiction.
Our theory, therefore, suggests that veto rights should, ceteris paribus, play an important role in federal states. There exists some empirical evidence supporting this. As mentioned in Section 6.3, some forms of bicameralism imply that the second chamber becomes a sort of veto player.
The second chamber's role as a veto player is enhanced when the two chambers are "incongruent" (Lijphard, 1999) e.g., because they are elected on very di¤erent franchises and when the second chamber has signi…cant powers to challenge the decisions of the …rst chamber. Lijphart (1999, table 11.2) shows that out of the ten countries with "incongruent" bicameralism that he studies, seven are federal states. Furthermore, in all of these seven cases, the second chamber holds signi…cant veto powers.
Finally, VT constitutions can only separate critical reforms from routine reforms if losers hold veto powers. In contrast, IS 2 constitutions need not identify losers ex ante since the optimal rule switching procedure ensures that they will reveal themselves and trigger a switch to the strict alternative majority rule each time a critical reform is on the agenda. This implies that ² IS 2 constitutions are, ceteris paribus, better than V T constitutions when it is di¢cult to grant veto rights to losers ( ² is small):
Appointing more than one veto holder can increase the likelihood that at least some losers hold veto powers and, in this way, alleviate the problem that VT constitutions have with correctly identifying losers ex ante. In Section 6.3, we argued that it is easier to identify losers in societies with clearly de…ned ethnic, religious or linguistic divisions and, as a consequence, our theory suggests that VT constitutions have an advantage in such societies. In contrast, in societies in which citizens tend to divide along ideological (and thus less veri…able) lines, it is hard to identify losers ex ante and ² tends be small. Accordingly, it is in such societies that IS 2 constitutions have an advantage. This makes intuitive sense: veto powers cannot be given to individuals conditional on their preferences, but when, for example, constitutional designers expect divisions to develop along ethnic lines, it is relatively easy to solve the problem by setting up election or nomination rules that guarantee that each ethnic minority veto has some degree of veto power.
In conclusion, constitutions with veto powers dominate constitutions that use incentive schemes to separate critical from routine reforms in societies with stable policy making processes in which critical reforms are relatively frequent and in which it is relatively easy to identify potential winners and losers ex ante. Incentive schemes, in the form of IS 2 constitutions, on the other hand, play a role mostly in societies in which the time horizon of policy makers is short and the length of the legislature is uncertain, in which critical reforms are rare but crucial and in which it is di¢cult to predict ex ante who will be a winner or a loser.
Conclusion
We have developed a new theory of constitutional design from behind the veil of ignorance.
Contrary to the recent literature on the topic, we do not focus on a single exogenously given constitutional rule. Instead, we study optimal packages of constitutional rules. The need to use more complex constitutional rules arises in our theory from the fact that the welfare consequences of reforms cannot be veri…ed objectively. To ensure that critical reforms are more di¢cult to pass than routine decisions, constitutional designers not only strive to design reform-dependent rules, but must also design procedures that can separate critical reforms from routine reforms. We consider two packages of rules -IS and VT constitutions -in detail and show how these second best rules achieve this objective. We show that IS constitutions, which employ a costly rule switching procedure to elicit information about the type of reform, tend to preform better than VT constitutions, which rely on veto holders to veto critical decisions, in situations where i) critical reforms carry high costs, but rarely appear on the agenda, ii) policy makers are relatively short-sighted and face an uncertain time horizon and iii) it is di¢cult to guarantee that veto powers fall into the hands of losers rather than winners. We believe that the general approach of the paper, not only o¤ers a new, uni…ed rationale for why real world constitutions employ popular referendums, allow for legislative obstruction and grant veto powers to constitutional players, but also that the approach can fruitfully be extended to explain many other types of rules that are often found in real world constitutions such as bills of rights, checks and balances, emergency powers and amendment rules.
It is clear, however, that our analysis leaves many important features of the collective decision problem that societies faces in reality to future research. In particular, in our model we ignore all the agency problems that arise when decision making power is delegated to politicians. 41 In addition, our policy space is very simple: in e¤ect we have only two alternatives chosen by Nature, which di¤er mainly by the loss in ‡icted upon losers. This means that agenda setting is not an issue and that Condorcet cycles cannot arise. Finally, we do not tackle the issue of who enforces the constitution. On the other hand, all these simpli…cations allows us to isolate what we believe to be a fundamental constitutional problem: reforms di¤er in their welfare e¤ects; these e¤ects cannot be veri…ed, and, therefore, the constitutional rules must be designed with this in mind. Understanding why a simple decision procedure such as the majority rule is, typically, not su¢cient to enable societies to resolve this problem adequately is of theoretical as well as of practical importance. Equally important, our analysis o¤ers a new interpretation of constitutional rules as diverse as the popular referendum, the …libuster and veto powers and reveals commonalities between these otherwise very di¤erent rules. They all share the common purpose of allowing societies to deal with the fundamental constitutional problem that critical reforms should be treated di¤erently from routine reforms.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 6 A VT constitution is a mechanism
T ¿=1 E where f?; V g T is the strategy spaces for the veto holder, Â ¿ a generic strategy for her while 42 ,
Begin by considering stage 5. We restrict attention to Nash equilibria with the property that if indi¤erent between vetoing or not, the veto holder does not veto. Given that the cost of using a veto when the threshold s is passed is arbitrary large, more than s vetoes will never be used. Given that, let s ¿ = s ¡ v (¿) be the number of vetoes left at time ¿ before the threshold s is is an optimal VT constitution for s ¤ V T 2 f1; :::; T ¡ 1g. To complete the analysis, we need to check the cases s = 0 and s = T and show that neither case can be optimal. We note that the s = 0 or s = T, given the optimal veto strategy, are outcome-equivalent to the optimal MR constitution. Thus, the constitutional designer will choose s = 0 or s = T, if and only if for all Noting that G ((1 ¡´) T; T ) = H ((1 ¡´) T; T), we can write this as follows
It follows that 
Proof of Proposition 7
We have ¡ (s; q + 1) ¡ ¡ (s; q)
Noting that G is a strictly convex function of s we then have that
